The The key results of the empirical study can be summarized as follows. 
Non-technical summary
The Value at Risk, i.e. the maximum loss that should not be exceeded in a certain period of time with a high probability, is the key figure for measuring market price risks in the banking sector. In this paper, we analyze the question of how a single economic risk figure for the Value at Risk of a hypothetical portfolio composed of different commercial banks might be obtained for a supervisor. We suggest different aggregation models with varying assumptions and check the suitability of these models in an empirical study. This study comprises all of the twelve German banks which used a risk model approved by the German supervisory authorities during the whole of the period under review from 2001 to
2003.
The key results of the empirical study can be summarized as follows.
1. The portfolio's Value at Risk can be estimated from time series data very well.
2. During 'normal' times, the Value at Risk of the portfolio is much lower than the sum of the single Values at Risk.
3. Depending on the bank, the increase in the portfolio's Value at Risk is between 5 and 62 cents for an increase of 1 euro in the Value at Risk of a single bank.
Introduction
Value at Risk (VaR) is a key figure for measuring market price risks in the financial sector.
Firstly, banks use this risk figure to control their own internal capital allocation. Secondly, Value at Risk can have immediate regulatory effects: after receiving approval from the supervisory authorities, banks are allowed to use their own risk models to calculate the Value at Risk of their trading book in order to determine the regulatory capital cushion.
The relevant literature looks at Value at Risk mainly from two points of view; firstly, from the perspective of a bank that wants to measure and manage the risks of its trading book positions accurately and, secondly, from the perspective of the supervisory authorities which have to deduce the suitability of the banks' risk models from past time series observations (backtesting). In this paper, we choose the perspective of the supervisor.
However, our main objective is not to check the suitability of risk models, but instead we aim to measure the risk of a portfolio composed of banks.
We have in mind a fictional supervisor who has to supervise a hypothetical portfolio composed of banks. Our research question is as follows: Assume that the banks in the portfolio keep no capital cushion on their own to cover losses from the trading book, what funds does a lender of last resort need to cover the market price risks of the banking sector? Under the assumption to be confirmed that all the banks' risk models work accurately, the regulator knows the risk of every single bank. However, he does not know the extent of comovement of the profits and losses in the cross-section of the banks or the positions and risk factors for individual banks. Therefore, he cannot aggregate the single risk figures of the banks to obtain the Value at Risk of the entire portfolio. The current -and for good reason established -approach which consists of summing up the Values at 1 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not need to be those of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We thank Andreas Backes, Frank Heid and Dirk Tasche for their helpful comments.
-2 -Risk of each legal entity complies with regulatory concerns about the impact of a single default to the banking system but neglects economic influences such as diversification effects and increasing cross-correlations during times of crises. Therefore, the main topics of this article are (i) to determine the cross-correlation of the profits and losses and (ii) to propose methods of aggregating the Value at Risk figures to obtain a portfolio Value at Risk. This portfolio Value at Risk allows the (fictional) lender of last resort to assess the capital needed to cover the market price risks in the banking sector.
There is a broad range of literature concerning the estimation of market price risks, especially in the area of conditional heteroskedasticity (See Engle (1982 ), Bollerslev (1986 and Rinne and Specht (2002) for an overview). There is also a large amount of literature on backtesting (for instance Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004) ). However, these articles deal mostly with the theoretical foundation of backtesting and seldom with the empirical examination of real data. The lack of empirical studies is most likely due to data constraints. Not surprisingly, most empirical studies in this field are conducted by people in the supervisory environment. This paper is one of the few studies that resort to real Value at Risk data time series (cf. also Stahl, Traber and Dietz (2002) ). We use daily profits and losses and the corresponding VaRs of German banks for the period from 2001 to 2003. The data comprise all of the twelve German banks which used a risk model approved by the supervisory authorities during the whole of the period under review. In addition, the data have the advantage that the daily profits and losses are calculated under the fictional assumption that the banks' trading book positions do not change within the day (clean profits and losses). Other studies in this context have had to make use of the (less suitable) economic profits and losses, for instance Berkowitz (2001) and Berkowitz and O'Brien (2004) . This paper is the first attempt to calculate the Value at Risk of a portfolio of banks from the Values at Risk of single banks. We use several models for the cross-correlation of the profits and losses. When necessary, we estimate correlation parameters from past observations so that the portfolio Values at Risk calculated according to the different -3 -models are out-of-sample. We validate these models with the backtesting techniques that are applied to single banks.
Like Jaschke, Stahl and Stehle (2003) and Jaschke, Stahl and Zapp (2004) , we observe a relatively low cross-correlation of the profits and losses. This low cross-correlation is the reason why the most appropriate model leads to a portfolio Value at Risk that is only half of the sum of all single Values at Risk. Depending on the bank, the increase in the portfolio's Value at Risk amounts to only between 5 and 62 cents for every 1 euro increase in the Value at Risk of a single bank. Roughly speaking, the regulatory capital for the twelve banks is proportional to the sum of the Values at Risk. As there are diversification effects between the banks, the economic capital requirement is much lower.
As mentioned by Berkowitz and O'Brien (2004) , academic literature often warns against destabilizing tendencies due to the systemic adoption of Value at Risk. Our analysis confirms that these warnings are rather of theoretic nature and can be rejected as there are significant diversification effects.
This article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we state our assumptions and give a brief overview of the methods of backtesting. These backtesting methods will later serve as a means of finding the most appropriate aggregation model. In Section 3, we present different approaches to aggregating the risk and calculate marginal risk contributions.
Section 4 is about the data description. In Section 5, we present our empirical results. Section 6 concludes this article. We denote the vector of profits and losses for the n banks by
Profits and Losses and Value at Risk

Notation and Assumptions
The Value at Risk i t V , is the maximum loss that should not be exceeded with a high probability (here: 99%) in a holding period of one day:
The function ( ) 
However, this holds true only if we restrict our analysis to the univariate case of one single bank.
In the following, we assume there to be normally distributed profits and losses. This assumption is justified because we deal with highly aggregated variables; in addition, the on-site inspections show that the normality assumption is a reasonable approximation (See, e.g., Jaschke, Stahl and Stehle (2003) ): 
which is consistent with "RiskMetrics" by JP Morgan (See Longerstaey (1996) ). The term
is the inverse of the standard normal distribution, calculated at 0.01 (and equals approximately -2.33). In the case of more than one bank, we generalize Equation (5) to
denotes a (possibly time-varying) covariance matrix. In contrast to the case for one single bank, the portfolio holdings comprise more information than the Values at Risk. Therefore, it is necessary to condition the profits and losses by the portfolio positions, otherwise one loses information concerning the cross-correlation of the profits and losses. While we have data concerning the banks' Values at Risk, there are no data on their trading book positions. As we cannot observe the cross-correlation, we have to estimate. This is the aim of Subsection 3.1.
The term
is the standardized return of bank i from time t to t+1. From Equations (5) and (6), we derive the following for the standardized returns:
If we define the covariance matrix t Ω as ) var( :
and the diagonal matrix t D as
, then we can write the profits and losses as
The covariance matrix of the profits and losses is
It can be shown that for each pairwise cross-correlation of the profits and losses the following relation holds:
The correlation of the profits and losses is of major importance for the following discussions. Equation (12) states that the correlation of the profits and losses corresponds to the correlation of the standardized returns. In the rest of this paper, we will use the standardized returns (instead of the profits and losses), because the standardized returns have a lot of desirable econometric properties (as can be seen from Equation (9)).
In addition, we define the number of exceedances as 
Validation
In this subsection, we present some validation methods for risk models. We will use these techniques twice in this paper: (i) to check whether the banks' risk models work accurately and (ii) to find out which of our proposed aggregation approaches leads to the most appropriate estimates for the portfolio Value at Risk.
There are a lot of methods of validating risk models. In this paper, we restrict our attention to the binomial test proposed by BCBS (1996b) and the calibration criteria suggested by Dawid (1982 Dawid ( , 1984 , Berkowitz (2001) , Stahl, Traber and Dietz (2002) , Stahl, Wehn and Zapp (2004) .
The binomial test tests the hypothesis that the exceedances occur with a probability of 1%.
According to Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) 
is also serially independent and identically uniformly distributed. In the appendix, we make use of this relation and plot the transformed random variable in order to see whether this transformed random variable is really uniformly distributed and serially independent.
Under the normality assumption, the relation from above can be expressed equivalently as:
Validation approaches which analyze the whole estimated distribution
based on the works of Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) . In addition, there are approaches from other areas with comparable research questions. For instance, Dawid (1982 Dawid ( , 1984 introduces so-called "calibration criteria". These criteria allow us to analyze whether the transformed random variable (14) differs from realizations of a uniformly and serially independent random variable. Dawid (1982) calls the adequacy of the distributional assumption "calibration" and the independence property is often called "resolution" (See for instance Overbeck and Stahl (2000) ). If there is serial correlation in the transformed random variable, then the dynamics are said to be inappropriately modelled. If (2003)).
In the appendix, we plot the estimated recalibration factors.
3 This does not imply that the transformed series 1, t i Z + is independent in the cross-section.
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The Risk of the Supervisor's Portfolio
The key contribution of this paper is the aggregation of single Value at Risk figures to obtain the Value at Risk of the entire portfolio. For this aggregation, the covariance matrix of the profits and losses -which is identical to that of the standardized returns (See Equation (12)) -is crucial. We propose different approaches to estimate this covariance matrix. In a second step, we determine marginal risk contributions.
Estimation of the Covariance Matrix
In this paper, we define the supervisory portfolio as the sum of all the trading book positions across the banks. Therefore, the profits and losses 
This assumes there to be a free flow of capital between the different parts of the supervisor's portfolio, i.e. between banks. Moreover, we resort to the normality assumption of Equation (5). Due to this assumption, the profits and losses 
As -in the case of normality -the Value at Risk is a multiple of the profits and losses standard deviation, we can write the Value at Risk of the supervisor's portfolio as
Equation (16) shows that the problem of aggregating the Value at Risk figures is reduced to determining the matrix t Ω . There are various approaches to determining t Ω . Table 1 shows the approaches which we will analyze in this paper. If there is no recalibration factor 
This implies the correlation matrix t Ω to consist solely of "1". The assumption of perfect correlation is a very conservative approach. The paper by Jaschke, Stahl and Stehle (2003) and our own analyses show that the banks' profits and losses are positively correlated, but that the correlation is relatively weak.
In the case of uncorrelated profits and losses ("uc", cases A2, A2a), the correlation matrix t Ω equals the identity matrix and the portfolio Value at Risk corresponds to the square root of the sum of the squared Values at Risk:
While the assumption of perfect correlation results in an upper bound, the uncorrelated profits and losses may yield the lower bound for the portfolio Value at Risk, because we expect the correlation to be weak, but positive in general.
-10 -In the third approach ("cc", cases A3, A3a), we allow more flexibility concerning the correlation structure: we assume that all pairwise correlations are equal to t ρ , which may be time-varying, i.e the correlation matrix t Ω is given by
The squared portfolio Value at Risk is then the weighted average of the squared portfolio
Values at Risk in the cases of perfectly correlated and uncorrelated profits and losses:
(1 )
For the empirical application, we replace the true correlation with its empirical counterpart:
If one allows an arbitrary (and possibly time-varying) correlation structure ("ac", cases A4, A4a, A4b), one has to estimate t Ω from time series data. In our analysis, we estimate the matrix t Ω from past observations of a rolling window of length T:
t T S S S S T
The approaches "pc", "uc" and "cc" force the cross-correlation into a tight structure. The advantage of this tight structure is that only one (or no) unobservable parameter has to be estimated. The fourth approach ("ac") shows much more flexibility with respect to the correlation structure. However, this flexibility comes at a price of having to estimate a large number of parameters (in the case of n banks, there are ( 1) /2 n n − pairwise correlations to be estimated and (if applicable) n recalibration factors). Therefore, one has to deal with the trade-off between parsimonious, but possibly incorrect models (approaches "pc", "uc" and "cc") and a flexible, but possibly overfitted model ("ac"). We cannot quantify the risk due to a possibly incorrect correlation structure, but we can quantify the estimation risk in the case of model A4a. Hence, we modify the case A4a to incorporate the 
. These two processes can be used to create a random variable that is Student-t distributed (see, e.g., Greene (2000)):
The distribution of Equation (25) 
where t 0.01,T-1 denotes the 1%-quantile of a Student-t distribution with T-1 degrees of freedom. 4 The Wishart distribution can be seen as the multivariate extension to the c² distribution. See, e.g., Anderson (1984 ) und Press (1972 .
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Marginal Risk Contribution
Only in the implausible special case of perfectly correlated profits and losses does the portfolio Value at Risk increase by the same amount if the Value at Risk of a single bank is increased. As a rule, the increase in the portfolio Value at Risk is significantly lower than the increase in the Value at Risk of a single bank. In this subsection, we aim to determine the marginal risk contribution of the banks to the risk of the supervisor's portfolio.
The marginal risk contribution of bank i is defined as
In the case of normally distributed profits and losses, it is possible to express the marginal risk contribution in a closed form. This expression for the marginal risk contribution is reminiscent of the risk contribution in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):
For the relative marginal risk contributions we get: 
t i t A t i t i t i t A t A t i t A t i t
5 See Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) .
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The relative marginal risk contribution (Equation (29) 
The Data
The data we use consist of the pairwise observations 
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 2 we report the first four moments of the distribution of the standardized returns , t i S . The mean of this distribution is always close to zero, the standard deviation is often marginally less than one. The skewness differs only slightly from zero, so that we can maintain the assumption of a symmetric distribution. However, the kurtosis often exceeds the value -the normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3 -that is in accordance with the normal distribution. Nevertheless, the QQ-plots as a measure of goodness-of-fit (as depicted in Figure 2 in the appendix) show that the normality assumption can be seen as a suitable approximation. The calibration and resolution criteria can be seen as being largely fulfilled. 
Cross-Correlation of Profits and Losses
The cross-correlations of the profits and losses are essential for the risk aggregation.
Therefore, we will report examples of these correlations and show their development over time. In Table 3 , we show the estimated correlation matrix for the point in time t=245. The aim is to give an impression of the magnitude and diversity of the cross-correlation. On average, the correlation is low and can even be negative. There are remarkable patterns like the negative correlation of bank A with respect to all other banks. In Figure 1 , we plot the mean cross-correlation t ρ as a function of time. The average mean correlation is 0.05. We see peaks following the events of September, 11 th 2001.
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Empirical Study
Preliminary Remarks
For the following analysis (Subsection 5.2) we presume that all Values at Risk reported by the banks are accurate. Moreover, we assume that the standardized returns are a standard normally distributed and serially independent time series. We checked these assumptions in univariate analyses of the single banks. The time series of the standardized returns and their squares show only minor serial correlation and the fraction of the explained variance that is due to past observations, 2 R , is insignificant. These results are an indication of efficient markets and the good quality of the banks' risk forecasts, i.e. there is no systematic underassessment or overassessment of the risk. The assumption of normality proves to be a good approximation as well. By way of exemplary evidence, we report the QQ-plot of three banks in Figure 2 in the appendix.
Generally speaking, we can say that the banks adequately measure their market risks.
Therefore, we can maintain the above assumption that the single Values at Risk are accurate and the main aggregation task consists of determining the correct correlation structure.
Comparison of Different Aggregation Approaches
In this subsection, we apply the different aggregation approaches of Subsection 3.1 to the data described in Section 4. We take the position of a regulator who knows the Value at Risk figures of all the banks for the following trading day. This regulator estimates the unobservable parameters necessary for the risk aggregation, i.e. correlations and recalibration factors, out of the last T=50 observations. It is important to state that our hypothetical regulator uses only past and no future information. Therefore, all of the estimated portfolio Values at Risk can be used for out-of-sample risk forecasts. The data set used in this paper can help to answer a lot more questions. Possible research questions are the identification of common risk factors (stock markets, interest rates, exchange rates) and the analysis of the Values at Risk in the course of time, especially during periods of stress.
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